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This paper addresses the question of how the responsibility for the
delivery of social services, including health, education, and welfare
programs,shouldbedividedbetweenstateandcentralgovernments.
We combine a random voting model and the incomplete contracts
paradigmtoformalizethetrade-offbetweencentralandstaterespon-
sibility for service delivery, and find that authority should rest with
the party for whom the marginal impact of the service on re-election
chances is greater. This in turn means that, other things equal, states
with lower than average health, education, or welfare status should
be given responsibility for service delivery, while authority in states
with above average indicators should reside with the central govern-
ment. Also, we show that there is no presumption that states that
are given authority for service delivery should necessarily be granted
expanded tax authority.
1. Introduction
This paper addresses the question of how the responsibility for the delivery of
social services, including health, education, and welfare programs, should be
divided between state and central governments. For example, should central
governments have the authority and responsibility to intervene and take over
the operations of state hospitals and schools, or should these residual control
rights rest with states? We examine these and related issues in the context of a
political economy model in which residents respond to the quality of services
provided, and to the tax cost imposed on them.1
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Traditional approaches to the decentralization of government (e.g.,
Oates 1972, 1999) identify local information advantages and interjurisdic-
tional spillovers as reasons to prefer local or central control over certain
allocative decisions. In the social sectors, the scope for interjurisdictional
spilloversseemslimited(exceptforpolicy-inducedmigrationsandapotential
“race to the bottom”—see e.g., Brueckner 2000), and while local preferences
doubtless differ, it is not always clear why central government policy cannot
be tailored to those preferences.2
There is a growing literature on the relative merits of public versus pri-
vate provision of publicly funded services. In the health sector, questions
of “corporatization” of public hospitals have been addressed by Harding
and Preker (2001). In the education literature, the merits of private provi-
sion or management of schooling, sometimes implemented through voucher
schemes,hasreceivedwidespreadattention(e.g.,Hoxby2002).3 Similarly,the
contracting out of employment placement and other welfare services was im-
plemented, for example, in Australia as part of that country’s public sector
reforms of the late 1990s.
At the theoretical level, Hart, Shliefer, and Vishny (1997) examined the
issueofpublicprovisionversuscontractingout,andBesleyandGhatak(2001)
investigated whether public goods should be publicly or privately owned.
These models employ the techniques of the incomplete contracts literature,
developed by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart
(1995).
This paper employs similar theoretical techniques, making extensive use
of the incomplete contracts model, to address the related issue of decentral-
ization of government. However, we enrich the incomplete contracts model
in order to realistically model political determinants of central and local de-
cisions, by adapting a random voting model (following, for example, Perrson
and Tabellini 2000) that allows explicit derivation of decision-makers’ ob-
jectives. In the model, central and state governments make investments in
complementary assets that together are used to produce public services. The
probabilityofre-electiondependsonthequalityoftheserviceproduced,and
the cost imposed on taxpayers.
When the two parties cooperate, the assets are used efficiently, and
service quality is high (conditional on the level of ex ante investments).
Cooperation is interpreted as the result of a Nash bargain, with associated
2Oates’ (1972) “decentralization theorem” states that in the absence of interjurisdictional
spillovers, decentralized decisions are preferred because central policy is assumed to be
uniform across states. Besley and Coate (1999) assume heterogeneous public good provi-
sion across states, and develop a model of political choice that yields a trade-off between
central and local provision.
3In April 2002, the Philadelphia School District’s School Reform Commission voted to
transfer control of 42 failing schools to seven for profit and nonprofit firms (National
School Boards Association 2002).Public Service Provision 411
intergovernmental transfers.4 These transfers do not serve any externality-
correction function as in traditional models of fiscal federalism, but just allo-
catethesurplusfromcooperationbetweenthecentralandlocalgovernments.
When the parties do not cooperate, one on them—perhaps as identified in
the constitution—provides the service, the quality of which falls below the
level achieved under cooperation. The specification of the party with respon-
sibility for service delivery in the event of noncooperation affects incentives
to make ex ante investments.
Oneofthecentralresultsofthepaper,reminiscentofBesleyandGhatak’s
(2001)analysis,isthatresponsibilityforservicedeliveryshouldbeallocatedto
that level of government for which the marginal benefit of quality is greater.
This result is robust in the sense that it does not depend on the relative
productivity of state and central investments. Due to the public good nature
of each party’s investment (improved service quality increases both parties’
chances of re-election), ownership improves the investment incentives of the
party with the higher marginal valuation of quality, but it reduces the invest-
mentincentivesofthepartywiththelowermarginalvaluation.Thusassigning
ownershiptothepartywiththehighermarginalvaluationunambiguouslyim-
proves both parties’ investment incentives.
Our analysis differs from Besley and Ghatak’s however in the sense that
these marginal benefits are endogenized in an explicit voting model. We
therefore do not have to rely on arbitrary differences in the preferences of
stateandcentralgovernments,5 butderivethesefromunderlyingheterogene-
ity across states. Another difference is that we allow multiple states, and show
that the allocation of responsibility should differ systematically across states.
In particular, it will never be optimal to allocate responsibility uniformly (ei-
ther to the center or to the states) across all states. That is, responsibility for
service delivery in some states should rest with the central government, while
responsibility in other states should reside with the state government.
Our other contribution is to examine the issue of financing authority in
the context of decentralization. It is natural to argue that decentralization of
responsibility for the provision of public services must be coupled with ade-
quate financial resources. In terms of the feasibility of meeting goals for the
level of services provided (e.g., maintaining or exceeding the level reached
under a centralized system), such advice seems indisputable (correcting for
any possible technologically determined efficiency differentials between cen-
tral and local provision).
We address a slightly more subtle financing issue in this paper however,
namely, how should the marginal cost of public funds be set for state govern-
ments? Under an optimal tax system, the marginal cost of funds will be as low
4Aseriesofpapers(e.g.,DeMezaandLockwood1998,RajanandZingales1998)examined
the effects of alternative bargaining protocols on optimal ownership rules in the context
of the theory of the firm.
5In Besley and Ghatak’s model, the two parties are the government and an NGO.412 Journal of Public Economic Theory
as possible (subject to revenue, administrative, and information constraints).
However, by intentionally narrowing the tax base accessible to state govern-
ments, the marginal cost of funds, which affects re-election prospects, can be
increased. We provide indicative evidence that when state governments are
optimally allocated responsibility for service delivery, it becomes more likely
that an increase in the marginal cost of public funds, achieved through a
narrowing of their tax base, could have a net positive effect on incentives for
ex ante investments. That is, there should be no presumption that state tax
authority should be increased in tandem with an increase in responsibility
for service delivery.
The next section of the paper sets up the model of service delivery and
how it affects re-election prospects. Section 3 examines the determination of
intergovernmental grants as side payments in a bargaining game over the use
ofexanteinvestments.Section4derivesoptimalandnoncooperativelevelsof
ex ante investments, and Section 5 states the conditions under which state or
central ownership/authority is preferred. Section 6 incorporates the choice
of state tax base in the analysis, and Section 7 briefly concludes.
2. Service Quality and Political Outcomes
Thereisacentralgovernment(c)andS stategovernments(s = 1,...,S).The
centralgovernmentmakesacapitalinvestmentKc andeachstategovernment
s invests Ks. Kc should be thought of as an investment in knowledge and
information, such as is undertaken by the National Institutes of Health in
the United States. On the other hand, Ks can be thought of as investment in
facilities such as hospitals. Similar models of education provision (where Kc
is educational research and Ks is schools, etc.) fit this framework.
When the two capital goods are used jointly and cooperatively by the
two governments, the quality of medical care in state s is Q s = Q(Kc,Ks). In
this section, it is assumed such cooperation obtains. However, if the central
government and state s do not use the capital goods cooperatively, the quality
of care in state s is lower, qs = q(Kc,Ks).
Each government cares about being re-elected, which we describe using
a random voting model (see e.g., Perrson and Tabellini 2000). In state s
there are Ns residents, and
 n
s=1 Ns = N. The underlying health status of
individual i in state s is denoted hi, which is distributed uniformly on an
interval[¯ hs − 1
2, ¯ hs + 1
2] ∈ R+.Allresidentsofallstateshavethesameincome
endowment, m. Publicly supplied health care services of quality Q s uniformly
increase the health status of all residents in state s by an amount Q s,s ot h e
health status of individual i in the presence of such services is xi = hi + Q s.
All residents have identical quasi-linear preferences over health status x, and
net money income m ,
u(x,m) = v(x) + m ,
where v(·) is increasing and concave.Public Service Provision 413
Taxes can be levied by each government to finance capital investment
and operating costs. We assume that residents of state s accurately attribute
liability for taxes to the relevant government, that is, they do not “blame” one
governmentfortaxesleviedbytheother.Ontheotherhand,sincethequality
of health service depends on capital investments of both governments, they
do not separately or differentially attribute the quality of care delivered to
the central or state bodies.
Thus, let ts be the (uniform across residents) tax levied by state s on its
residents,andlettc bethe(uniformacrossallresidentsofallstates)taxlevied
by the central government. Ts = ts + tc is the total tax levied on each resident
of state s.
In the absence of a public health system, individual i’s utility is simply
u(hi,m).Whenhealthservicesinstates areofqualityQ s,andstateandcentral
taxes are Ts, individual i’s utility is u(hi + Q s,m − Ts). There is a state-level
random effect ηs distributed uniformly on [¯ ηs − 1
2, ¯ ηs + 1
2], that measures
(uniformly across residents of state s) a bias against the state government
beingre-elected.Finally,thereisanindependentrandomeffectηc distributed
uniformly on [¯ ηc − 1
2, ¯ ηc + 1
2], measuring the (uniform across all residents in
all states) bias against central government re-election.
Individual i resident in state s will vote for the re-election of the state
government if and only if
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[exp(ηs + ts) − 1]
≡ φ(Q s,ts,η s).
The proportion of residents in state s who vote for re-election of the state
government is thus φ(Q s,ts,η s) − (¯ hs − 1
2), and the state government is re-
elected if this represents a majority, i.e., if
φ(Q s,ts,η s) > ¯ hs.
Thus the probability that the state government is re-elected, ps, is equal to
the probability that the realized state shock ηs is less than ln(1 + Q s/¯ hs) − ts,















below, the probability of re-election is strictly between 0 and 1.6
Similarly, individual i in state s will vote for the re-election of the central
government if and only if
ln
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− tc ≥ ηc,
that is, if and only if
hi ≤ φ(Q s,tc,η c) ≡ φc
s.
The number of votes the central government receives from state s is Ns ×
[φc
s − (¯ hs − 1


























where ¯ Q =
 S
s=1 NsQ s/N is the national weighted average quality of health
services and ¯ h =
 S
s=1 Ns ¯ hs/N is the national average health status in the















Again, we assume than in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, this probability
is between 0 and 1.
3. Ex Post Bargaining
Each level of government chooses and finances its capital investment. State
and central governments can also make transfers between each other, fi-
nanced by taxes on their constituents. Thus the total per capita tax levied by
6The variable ¯ ηs could be interpreted as a measure of political accountability at the state
level, a higher value making it less easy on average, for an incumbent government to be
re-elected. However, note that the marginal impact of the quality of public services vis-` a-vis
health status on the probability of re-election does not vary across states. This assumption is
nontrivial, as it is likely that poorer status, in which political participation is more limited,
may have weaker accountability mechanisms.Public Service Provision 415
state government s,i sts = Ks/Ns − τs/Ns, where Ks is the capital investment
made by the state, and τs is the transfer (possibly negative) the state receives
from the central government. The total per capita tax levied by the central
government is tc = Kc/N + τ/N, where τ =
 S
s=1 τs is the aggregate central
government transfer to states.
Thus, if the central government and the state governments cooperatively
utilizethecapitalgoodsinplace,theprobabilitiesofre-electionofthecentral













































We search for Nash bargaining outcomes between the central
government and each state government. To this end, define ¯ Q−s =
(
 
s  =s Ns Qs )/(
 
all s  Ns ), and τ−s = (
 
s  =s τs ). If the center cooperates























where ˜ Q−s = ¯ Q−s + nsqs and ns = Ns/N. The probability of the government


















That is, when the parties do not cooperate, the quality of health care in state s
falls from Q s to qs. At the same time, there is no intergovernmental transfer,
τs, between the center and state s.
Cooperation thus increases the probability of re-election of the central
government by
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and of the government of state s by
 ps = ps − p s
s
= ln
 ¯ hs + Q s






Assuming the central government and the governments of states s   = s coop-
erate, under the Nash bargaining solution, the central government and the
government of state s set τs so as to









  ¯ h + ¯ Q
¯ h + ˜ Q−s
 
− Ns ln
 ¯ hs + Q s
¯ hs + qs
  
. (3)





Taking the capital investment of the central government as sunk, and
the agreements with and transfers to the other state governments s   = s as
fixed, the transfers to state s in Equation (3) can be interpreted more easily
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where Gc and Gs are the direct gains from cooperation (in terms of increased
probabilities of re-election) that accrue to the central and state governments,
respectively. The central government thus gives up half of its direct gains by
making a gross transfer of NGc/2 dollars to state s. The cost of this transfer,
in terms of reduced probability of election, is Gc/2. State s in turn gives up
half of its direct gains (Gs/2), making a reciprocal gross dollar transfer equal
to NsGs/2, the benefit of which (to the central government) is NsGs/2N.
Our implicit assumption is that each central–state bargain is negotiated
undertheexpectationthatallothernegotiationsaresuccessful.(Sincepayoffs
arelinearistransfers,allthatmattersisthateachstateassumesthatotherstates
will negate to an efficient use of resources with the central government.) This
counterfactualdeterminestheanticipatedoutsideoptionsineachbargaining
relationship, and hence the bargaining power of the parties. We thereforePublic Service Provision 417
interpret the set of S bargains as constituting a Nash equilibrium among
states.
4. Ex Ante Investments
4.1. Efﬁcient Capital Investments
The Pareto efficient investments by the central and state governments satisfy
max
Kc,K
pc(Kc,K) s.t. ps(Kc,Ks) ≥ p 0
s
for some constants p 0
s ,s = 1,...,S, where K is the vector of states’ invest-
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and µc ≡
1
¯ Q + ¯ h


















where µs is the marginal impact of quality (evaluated at that level of quality
achieved when the assets are used cooperatively) on state s’s probability of
re-election. Similarly, µc is the marginal impact of quality on the central
government’s electoral chances.7 Equation (7) simply requires that the total
7A reduced form model similar to Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) could be written down using
these marginal valuation parameters. For example, if there is just one state government,
the payoff to government x (central or state) might be specified as
πx = µxQ(Kc,Ks) − tx,
where tx is the net tax revenue raised by x to finance capital investment Kx and intergov-
ernmental transfers.418 Journal of Public Economic Theory
marginal benefit of state s’s capital investment (to both the state and central
governments) equals its marginal cost (measured in terms of the reduced
probabilityofre-electionforstates).States’sinvestmentthereforerepresents
a public good (vis-a-vis itself and the central government), and (7) is just
the Samuelson condition for its optimal provision. Similarly, (8) says that
the marginal benefits of central government investment, that accrue to all
states and the center, should equal the marginal cost (measured in terms of
the reduced probability of re-election for the center). Denote the efficient
investment levels by Keff
s and Keff
c .
4.2. Noncooperative Capital Investments
The central government and each state government choose levels of invest-
ment noncooperatively, anticipating the bargains they will enter into ex post.
Thus the central government takes the vector of state investment choices, K,







































s (Kc,K−s,Ks) ≡ τ∗
s (Kc,K).
State s’s optimal investment thus satisfies
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and that of the central government satisfies
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Conditions (11) and (12) define Nash equilibrium investments, which we
denote by K∗
s , for s = 1,...,S, and K∗
c .
4.3. Interpretation
In order to interpret these conditions, let us suppose that qs and Q s are
sufficiently close that we have
µs ≡
1
Q s + ¯ hs
≈
1





¯ Q + ¯ h
≈
1
˜ Q−s + ¯ h
. (14)420 Journal of Public Economic Theory





































Under the assumption that the productivity of investment is lower when the
parties do not cooperate (i.e., ∂qs/∂Kx <∂ Q s/∂Kx for x = s,c) a comparison




for s = 1,...,S and K∗
c < Keff
c .
The extent of underinvestment by each party depends, inter alia, on the
relative sizes of µc and µs.8 From (13) and (14), we see that states where
average health status (including the effects of health services) is higher than




its investment is higher) when µs >µ c than when µs <µ c.
5. Ownership
The model developed in the previous sections allows us to study the effects of
alternative allocations of the ownership of public facilities in the context of
intergovernmentalrelations.Followingthestandardliteratureonincomplete
contracts and the theory of the firm (e.g., Hart 1995), we assume that formal
ownership affects outside options in the bargaining games that the parties
might enter into. This in turn effects incentives to make ex ante investments.
Thereisafundamentalasymmetrybetweenthecapitalinvestmentsmade
bycentralandstategovernments,derivingfromthefactthatthecentrallypro-
duced capital good has the features of a public good vis-a-vis all the state gov-
ernments. On the other hand, each state-produced capital good confers no
externalbenefitsonotherstates.9 Inthiscontext,wethinkofownershipasau-
thority to take over the operation of the state-produced asset in the event that
thestateandcentralgovernmentdonotagreeonhowitistobeused.10 Thus,
8Of course, the µs’s and µc are related, and it cannot be the case that µs <µ c (or µs >µ c)
for all s.
9We do not allow for external effects associated with cross-border flows of patients, etc.
10Because of the public good nature of the center’s capital investment, it is difficult to
imagine a state government being granted ownership of the center’s asset.Public Service Provision 421
state government ownership might be identified with institutional arrange-
ments wherein hospital managers are state employees, that is, answerable to
state government officials, while under central ownership the managers are
employees of the central government.
When the parties do not agree on the use of the assets, the owner of the
state asset delivers health services unilaterally. If the center delivers services
without the cooperation of the state, it has access to the state-produced asset,
butmaynotbeabletouseitefficiently.Ontheotherhand,ifthestatedelivers
the services unilaterally, it does so with only partially effective access to the
centrally produced asset. One way to model these inefficiencies, following
Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), is to assume that some of the value of the
assetproducedbyagivenpartyisembodiedinthehumancapitalofmanagers
employed by that party, so that when the manager is replaced the effective




in state s under state and central operation, respectively (the superscript de-
notes the owner of the facility), and to assume that the marginal productivity

























Condition (17) says that the marginal product of central government in-
vestment is higher when services are delivered cooperatively than when the
center delivers them unilaterally, and that the marginal product of central
investment is even smaller when the state unilaterally operates the system.
Equation (18) is the corresponding condition of state-produced capital.12
Inspection of Equations (15) and (16) indicates, as long as the approx-
imations are valid, that in order to induce higher investment by both state
and central governments, facilities in state s should be owned by the party
for which the marginal value of quality (in terms of increased probability
of re-election) is higher. This result mirrors that independently derived by
Besley and Ghattak (2001), which states that ownership should reside with
the party that cares relatively more about quality. In particular, to strengthen
11An extreme assumption is that the center’s asset is unavailable to a state government
employee in the event of noncooperation. It is reasonable to assume, however, that some
of the benefits of the center’s asset spillover to the state, even when it does not formally
have access to the asset, e.g., if the asset is R&D research.
12These conditions correspond to Assumption 1 in Besley and Ghattak’s (2001) model of
government versus private ownership of public goods.422 Journal of Public Economic Theory
incentives for investment in complementary assets, health facilities should be
owned locally in states where average health status is lower than the national
average, and they should be owned by the central government in states with
relatively healthy populations. Such ownership allocations will be optimal be-
cause they maximize capital investments at levels that are nonetheless below
the first-best levels defined by conditions (7) and (8).13
Some intuition for this result can be found by integrating the left-hand
side of (15) to obtain a linearized expression for state s’s probability of re-










If µc >µ s, state s has an incentive to make qs as low as possible, since this
increases the ex post surplus from cooperation. As the central government
values cooperation more than the state, it is willing to pay more to avoid a
breakdown of cooperation ex post, that is, state s holds up the center. When
s is the owner, withholding investment reduces qs significantly, but when c is
the owner s can do less damage by withholding its investment. Thus when
µc >µ s, the state’s investment incentives are stronger (that is, s’s incentives
to underinvest are weaker) when c is the owner.
Ontheotherhand,thecenter’sexpostutility,associatedwiththebargain










When µc >µ s, the center has an incentive to make qs as large as possible.
This incentive is reinforced by making it the owner. Thus, allocation of own-
ership to the party with the higher marginal valuation of quality improves the
investment incentives of both parties.
6. Financing Authority
We modify the model now to incorporate the distortionary costs of tax col-
lection. Setting the distortionary cost of public funds, by choosing the tax
base accordingly, allows the parties to alter implicit investment incentives in
a nontrivial way. Let us then assume that in raising a dollar of revenue from
an individual, the central government reduces that individual’s income by
(1 + λc) dollars. Similarly, state government s reduces the income of a resi-
dent by (1 + λs) dollars when it raises a dollar. By narrowing the tax base, λ
13That is, there is no ownership allocation that would induce too much investment.
14This would be called s’s ex post utility in a more standard model.Public Service Provision 423













































respectively. After some algebra, it can be shown that the noncooperative
investments chosen by the parties satisfy the following modified versions of
Equations (15) and (16):
1
2

































where ˆ µc = µc(1 + λc), ˆ µs = µs(1 + λs), and φ(λ) = 2/(1 + λ)2 − 1.
In the previous section, we assumed that ownership of the state’s asset
could be allocated to the central or state government, but that ownership of
the centrally produced asset could not easily be granted to the state. Here
we make a similar assumption with respect to tax bases, that is, that the tax
base of the central government is fixed, but that of the state is potentially
variable.15 Thus, denote the left-hand side of (21) by zs(λs), and that of (22)





























Thus, restricting the taxing authority of a state government (increasing λs)
necessarily reduces the equilibrium level of state investment for two reasons.
First, a higher λs makes Ks more expensive. Second, for a given pair of invest-
ments (Ks,Kc), the center makes a smaller transfer τ∗
s to s because a dollar is
worthmoretothestate.Therefore,theshareofthesurplusfromcooperation
enjoyed by s falls.














15The idea is that the central government must use a single tax base for all revenue it
collects, and cannot make commitments with different states to use different tax bases.424 Journal of Public Economic Theory
so restricting a state’s tax base improves the investment incentives of the
centralgovernment.Thereisthussomeambiguitysurroundingtheneteffect
ofarestrictioninthetaxingauthorityofstategovernmentsontheequilibrium
quality of services, and the probabilities of re-election.
A weak result that we can derive is that in those cases in which a state
governmentisoptimallyallocatedownershipofthestate-producedasset(i.e.,
when µs >µ c), zs 
(λs) is less negative and zc 
(λs) is more positive (from
conditions (17) and (18)). Qualitatively, in these cases it is more likely that
an increase in λs will be optimal, compared with situations in which central
ownership is optimal.
Amoreforcefulstatementoftheprecedinganalysisisthat,withinthecur-
rent context, there should be no presumption that ownership and financing
authority should necessarily coincide. Indeed, on balance state governments
should be afforded greater tax authority (lower distortionary costs of raising
revenues) only when they do not have formal authority to operate facilities
in the event that intergovernmental bargaining breaks down.
Although this result is rather weak, the intuition for it follows directly
from the intuition for the ownership allocation, elaborated on at the end
of the previous section. Suppose µs >µ c, so the state government should
optimally be the owner. Increasing the marginal cost of public funds the state
faces increases the value of a dollar transferred by the center. Other things
being equal then, at a Nash bargain the size of the central transfer will be
smaller. This increases the incentive of the center to invest, as it retains more
of the returns to its investment. Since it is the underinvestment of the center
thatneedstobemitigated,thevalueoftheimprovementincentralincentives
outweighs the value of the reduction in state incentives.
7. Conclusion
This paper has addressed the question of the decentralization of public ser-
vice delivery by asking which level of government should have responsibility
for providing services out of equilibrium. The focus has been not on perfor-
manceincentivesintheday-to-dayoperationofhospitals,schools,andwelfare
programs, but on the incentives of central and state governments to invest
in capital assets that improve the quality of services. One interpretation of
our model is that it assumes that operational incentives, e.g., for managers
etc., can be provided through explicit labor contracts, but that investment
incentives are less easily specified.
In our model, authority to intervene in the operation of facilities should
restwithstateswithbelowaveragehealth,education,orwelfarestatus.Inthese
states, the marginal impact of quality on re-election prospects is higher for
the state government than for the central government, so the state effectively
cares more about quality than the center. In other states, the marginal impact
of the state’s investment is smaller than that of the center’s.
Finally, increasing the cost of taxation at the state level can effect the di-
vision of ex post surpluses, because it alters the relative price of tax revenuesPublic Service Provision 425
between the two parties. Since investment incentives are generated in part
by the expectation of sharing in ex post surpluses, increasing the state-level
cost of funds tends to reduce state investment levels but increase central
investment. The net effect on quality is ambiguous, but there is no presump-
tion that authority for service delivery should be matched with expanded tax
authority.
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